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Abstract
We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains
of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can
be maintained.
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Introduction
The definition of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’ is part and parcel of
many a textbook in epistemology, even though Gettier-like counterexamples
date back to Plato’s Theaetetus. The existence of counterexamples is however
not the only problem that the definition faces. It also runs into the Regress
Problem: if my belief in a true proposition S0 is justified by my belief in
another true proposition, S1, which in turn is justified by my belief in still
another true proposition S2, and so on, ad infinitum, then I have no epistemic
justification whatsoever for a belief in any of the propositions S0, S1, S2, . . .
etc.
One might try to take the sting out of the Regress Problem by ton-
ing down the definition to a more modest version, one in which we content
ourselves with probabilistic support rather than full-blown justification and
where we are satisfied with degree of belief rather than belief tout court. But
this move clearly does not help us, for a probabilistic variant of the Regress
Problem is readily made: if I partially believe S0 because S0 is probabilisti-
cally supported by S1, and partially believe S1 because it is probabilistically
supported by S2, and so on, then it seems that we are not even partially
justified in believing any of the propositions S0, S1, S2, . . . etc.
Although the Regress Problem is a threat to both foundationalists and
coherentists, we will concentrate on its significance for the former. As is
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well known, foundationalists hold that every process of inferential or con-
ditional justification must come to an end in a basic proposition that is
itself non-inferentially or immediately justified. Foundationalists of the old,
non-probabilistic school claim that this basic proposition must be absolutely
certain, and some of them maintain that it is even a priori. Contemporary
foundationalists however mostly wear probabilistic colours, and they argue
that the basic proposition need not amount to absolute certainty. It is enough
if its unconditional probability can be established, and if it is such that it
probabilistically supports another proposition p, which means that the con-
ditional probability of p given that the basic proposition is true, is greater
than the conditional probability of p given that the basic proposition is false.
But no matter what their different views may be on basic propositions and
on the nature of justification, both factions share the same horror infinitatis:
the concept of an endless chain of inferential justifications not only bewilders
the old-style foundationalists, but remains anathema for their probabilistic
offspring as well.1
In this paper we focus on the probabilistic variant: we will deal with foun-
dationalism and with the Regress Problem only insofar as they are clothed in
probabilistic raiment. In particular, we will discuss two objections that prob-
abilistic foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic
justification. We shall first recall the reply of Peter Klein to these objec-
tions, but then we will give a better reply, one which shows that neither of
the objections hold water.
1. Two objections
When one looks at the plurality of objections that probabilistic foundation-
alists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification, two in
particular stand out. Each of them can in principle also be deployed by ‘ordi-
nary’ foundationalists in arguing against ‘ordinary’ infinite chains, but here
we are especially interested in the way they are used within a probabilistic
setting. Both objections are explicitly discussed in the polemic between Carl
Ginet and Peter Klein [2, p. 131–155], but they can be found at many other
places in the literature.
1The distinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistic foundationalism corre-
sponds to Bonjour’s distinction between moderate and strong foundationalism [1, p. 26–
30]
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The first objection refers to our limited cognitive capacity and we will
call it the finite mind objection. The idea is that we, with our finite minds,
are unable to complete an infinite probabilistic chain:
“Even if I could have an infinite number of beliefs, how would
I ever know anything if knowledge required an infinite epistemic
chain?” [3, p. 183].
“... finite minds cannot complete an infinitely long chain of rea-
soning and so, if all justification were inferential, no-one would be
justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever”
[4, p. 40]; [5, p. 2]; [6, p. 150].
The second objection implies that (partial or probabilistic) justification can
never be created by inferences alone. We dub it the transfer objection, after
its formulation by Carl Ginet:
“Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it
from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there
actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. .... [T]here can
be no justification to be transferred unless ultimately something
else, something other than the inferential relation, does create
justification” [7, p. 148] (italics by the author).
Here the thought is that propositions in an endless chain of probabilistic
justifications are not really justified. The only way to justify them would be to
end the chain with a proposition that is itself noninferentially justified. Since
the chain in question is supposed to be probabilistic, this last proposition
must be an unconditional probability statement of the form P (Sn+1), where it
is understood that Sn+1 probabilistically supports Sn, so that P (Sn|Sn+1) >
P (Sn|¬Sn+1). In an attempt to lend force to this objection, Ginet cites
Jonathan Dancy:
“Justification by inference is conditional justification only; [when
we justify A by inferring it from B and C] A’s justification is
conditional upon the justification of B and C. But if all justifica-
tion is conditional in this sense, then nothing can be shown to be
actually, non-conditionally justified.” [8, p. 55].
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So in Dancy’s view, a proposition is actually or really justified if and only if
its justification is in the end non-conditional. In the context of probabilistic
justification, this view implies that a proposition S0 is only really justified
if in the end we can calculate its non-conditional probability, P (S0). But
if P (S0) were to depend on an infinite chain of conditional probabilities of
the form P (Sn|Sn+1), then, according to Dancy, there is no non-conditional
probability to be justified.
As a long standing supporter of epistemic infinitism, Peter Klein has re-
peatedly argued against the foundationalists’ dislike of infinite chains [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13]. In his view there is nothing troublesome with infinite regresses,
the reason being that an infinite chain of reasoning need not be completed.
What is more, the requirement that an infinite chain must be completed
“would be tantamount to rejecting infinitism” [9, p. 920]. The only thing
that an infinitist requires, Klein argues, is that for every proposition Sn in
the probabilistic chain, there is a proposition Sn+1 such that the conditional
probability P (Sn|Sn+1) is known to be greater than P (Sn|¬Sn+1), for that
is the condition under which we can properly say that Sn+1 probabilistically
supports Sn.
As Klein sees it, the Regress Problem is only a problem because it has
been given a faulty formulation. Once we phrase it correctly, the problem
loses its force. Consider again our infinite chain of propositions S0, S1, S2, . . .
etc., where each Sn is probabilistically justified by Sn+1. If we now were
to ask how a belief in any of those propositions can be justified, we would
be asking too much. What we should ask is how a belief in each of those
propositions can be justified, and the answer to this question is simple: the
justification comes from the proposition one step up in the chain [11, p. 729].
Claiming that a particular proposition Sn is (partially or probabilistically)
justified means no more than being able to point to another proposition Sn+1
that bestows the support in question, and that in turn receives support from
still another proposition. This, and nothing more, is what infinitism claims.2
Given these views, it is clear what Klein’s replies to the two objections
are. His reply to the finite mind objection is that we need not, and should
not, attempt to complete an infinite chain: any completion of such a chain
would fly in the face of infinitism. As to the transfer objection, Klein’s reply
is plainly to deny that real justification implies unconditional justification, or
2Actually there is rather more. At several places Klein intimates that all justifications
have this structure, and that might be questionable.
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that an infinite chain of conditional probabilities can culminate in a particular
value for an unconditional probability. In Klein’s view,
“Infinitism ... depicts justification as emerging when the set of
propositions that are appropriately adduced as reasons expands.
Of course, were the foundationalist to insist on thinking of war-
rant as originating in some propositions and then being trans-
ferred by inference to other propositions, he or she would be beg-
ging the question at hand. For it is this very concept of warrant
that infinitism is challenging.” [13, p. 152].
Klein’s replies to the two objections are interesting, but in our view he con-
cedes too much. He grants the foundationalists that finite minds cannot
complete infinite chains and he also grants them that, were ‘real warrant’
the same as ‘unconditional warrant’ or as unconditional probability, justifi-
cation on the basis of an infinite epistemic chain would be impossible. Neither
of these concessions is necessary, as will be explained in the next section.
2. The objections refuted
Consider once more our chain S0, S1, S2, . . . etc., where each Sn+1 proba-
bilistically justifies Sn. Are we able to justify S0, in the sense that we can
compute P (S0)? As we have seen, Audi and Fumerton deny that we can
by referring to the finite mind objection; Ginet and Dancy deny the same
on the basis of the transfer objection. Below we propose to deal with both
objections, starting with the latter.
Dancy’s text makes it clear that there is a striking similarity between
the transfer objection and C.I. Lewis’s reasons for claiming that an endless
epistemic chain does not make sense [8, p. 57]. It is true that Lewis is an
old style foundationalist, but his ideas are easily adapted to foundationalism
of probabilistic stripe.3 What Dancy does not say, however, is that Lewis’s
critique of infinite epistemic chains is ambiguous or even incoherent, and that
3For example, consider: “The supposition that the probability of anything whatever
always depends on something which is only probable itself, is flatly incompatible with
the assignment of any probability at all.” [14, p. 173]. This is easily probabilized to:
“The supposition that the unconditional probability of anything whatever always depends
on something which is only conditionally probable itself, is flatly incompatible with the
assignment of any unconditional probability at all.”
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the incoherence may be present in one and the same article (for example in
[14, p. 173]). On the one hand Lewis suggests that, where any regress of
probability values is involved, the value of P (S0) cannot be computed. On
the other hand he claims that, under these circumstances, the value of P (S0)
will always be zero.
It seems to us that the transfer objection suffers from a similar ambiguity.
Consider Dancy’s phrase “if all justification is conditional, then nothing can
be shown to be actually, non-conditionally justified”. What does this phrase
mean for the value of P (S0), if this value were to be determined by an infinite
chain of conditional probabilities? Does it mean that it is impossible to say
what exactly this value is? Or does it mean that the value becomes zero?
Under the first interpretation, the transfer objection seems to boil down to
the finite mind objection; for the latter assumes that P (S0) has a definite
value, but that our tiny brains lack the equipment to compute it. Under
the second interpretation, on the other hand, the transfer objection once was
supported by no one less than Bertrand Russell. Russell argued that, in the
case at hand, the value of P (S0) is given by the product
P (S0) = P (S0|S1)× P (S1|S2)× P (S2|S3)× . . . and so on, ad infinitum.
Since all the factors in this product are less than one, Russell concludes
that P (S0) “may be expected to be zero” [15, p. 434]. However, as Hans
Reichenbach first pointed out in a letter to Russell on March 28, 1949, this
argument is flawed. For it is simply not true that the value of P (S0) is given
by the product above. Rather P (S0) is given by the rule of total probability
P (S0) = P (S0|S1)P (S1) + P (S0|¬S1)P (¬S1), (1)
where P (S1) is
P (S1) = P (S1|S2)P (S2) + P (S1|¬S2)P (¬S2), (2)
and P (¬S1) is
P (¬S1) = P (¬S1|S2)P (S2) + P (¬S1|¬S2)P (¬S2), (3)
and so on, ad infinitum. Since (1)–(3) are sums rather than products, the
fact that all the terms in these equations are less than one does not imply
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that the outcome generally tends to zero. Two weeks after having received
Reichenbach’s letter Russell replied, admitting his error.4
One may accept that P (S0) need not be zero, but still think that it cannot
be computed. For how should we compute an unconditional probability if
the only thing we know is an infinite number of conditional probabilities?
This question takes us back to the finite mind objection. In the rest of this
paper, we nullify this objection by actually completing a particular infinite
probabilistic chain.
In our chain of propositions Sn, with n = 0, 1, 2, . . . etc., it is supposed
that the conditional probabilities αn and βn
αn = P (Sn|Sn+1)
βn = P (Sn|¬Sn+1)
are known for all n. We may write
P (Sn) = αnP (Sn+1) + βnP (¬Sn+1) , (4)
where the unconditional probabilities P (Sn) and P (¬Sn) are unknown. If we
now write P (¬Sn+1) as 1− P (Sn+1) and introduce the abbreviation
γn = αn − βn = P (Sn|Sn+1)− P (Sn|¬Sn+1) ,
then we can rewrite Eq.(4) as
P (Sn) = αnP (Sn+1) + βn − βnP (Sn+1) = βn + γnP (Sn+1) . (5)
In order to calculate P (S0), we can now simply iterate (5), obtaining
P (S0) = β0 +γ0β1 +γ0γ1β2 + . . .+γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn +γ0γ1 . . . γnP (Sn+1) . (6)
If P (Sn+1) were known, (6) could be used to calculate P (S0). But the dif-
ficulty is of course that P (Sn+1) is not known. In contradistinction to the
first n+ 1 terms of (6), which are all conditional probabilities and therefore
known, the last term in (6), like the last term in (5), contains the unknown
4“... you are right as to the mathematical error that I committed ...” (Russell to
Reichenbach in a letter of April 22, 1949). We thank Carl Spadoni of the Mills Memorial
Library, McMaster University (Hamilton, Canada), for sending us a copy of the letter.
C.I. Lewis remained unconvinced, however. See [16] for a further analysis of the debate
between Lewis, Reichenbach and Russell.
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unconditional probability P (Sn+1). So it would seem that we have come to
a dead end, and that old and new foundationalists have a point after all.
The old ones claim that the iteration can only be terminated by a supposed
certainty, P (Sn+1) = 1; the new ones say that a smaller value will serve, e.g.
P (Sn+1) =
1
4 , but both insist that a definite value of P (Sn+1) is necessary
to enable one to calculate P (S0).
However, here is a counterexample that demonstrates the falsity of these
foundationalist claims. Elsewhere one of us has given a counterexample based
on a geometrical series, and one based on an exponential series [17]. The
following example has the advantage that is much simpler than either of
these, in that the series reduces in the end to the sum of two terms only.
Take
αn = 1− 1
n+ 3
βn =
1
n+ 3
, (7)
so that
γn = αn − βn =
(
1− 1n+3
)
−
(
1
n+3
)
= n+3n+3 − 2n+3 = n+1n+3 . (8)
In order to calculate (6), let us begin by evaluating parts of it, notably the
last term and the penultimate one. The last term is γ0γ1 . . . γnP (Sn+1) and
the coefficient in this term can be computed as
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1γn = 13 × 24 × 35 × 46 × . . .× n−1n+1 × nn+2 × n+1n+3
= 2(n+2)(n+3) . (9)
This is a very compact result, thanks to the cancellations between numerators
and denominators of the factors 3, 4, 5, . . . , n− 1, n, n + 1. The penultimate
term in (6) can be written as
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn = 13 × 24 × . . .× n−1n+1 × nn+2 × 1n+3
= 2(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)
= 1n+1 − 2n+2 + 1n+3 . (10)
With the definition
δn =
1
n+1 − 1n+2 , (11)
one can check that
δn − δn+1 = 1n+1 − 2n+2 + 1n+3 . (12)
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So from (10) and (12) it is clear that
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn = δn − δn+1 . (13)
Plugging (9) and (13) into (6), we find
P (S0) = β0+(δ1−δ2)+(δ2−δ3)+ . . .+(δn−δn+1)+ 2(n+2)(n+3)P (Sn+1). (14)
Since δ2, δ3, . . . δn cancel out, (14) can be simplified to
P (S0) = β0 + δ1 − δn+1 + 2P (Sn+1)
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
. (15)
In the limit that n tends to infinity, (n+ 2)(n+ 3) in the denominator grows
without bound. Consequently the last term in (15) vanishes, since P (Sn+1),
whatever it is, cannot be greater than unity. Moreover, δn+1 disappears in
the limit, as can be seen from (11). On taking the limit in (15) we are left
with
P (S0) = β0 + δ1 =
1
3 +
1
6 =
1
2 . (16)
This example undermines all claims that an infinite regress of probabilities
cannot make sense, or that it must always leads to zero, or that it can never
be completed.
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